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Abstract 
European Union’s competition rules apply to all entities developing economic activities within the Member States. Companies 
whose market behaviours do not comply with EU regulation regarding competition rules take the risk to be fined and face the 
negative consequences of their actions (the legal actions of those affected by anticompetitive practices; image injuries, both 
connected to trade partners and to their customers and so on). Cartels as well as the arrangements between competitors do 
represent violations of competition law and they are always under the monitoring of competition authorities. Among the cartels, 
the most damaging for the development of a normal competitive environment, are the so-called “hard core cartels” which could 
be the price fixing cartels, the output restricting cartels, those of market sharing or of participation in bid rigging. The aim of this 
research paper is to present the main legal issues concerning the competition law as well as three case studies on anticompetitive 
practices in terms of cartels as they appear at the European Union’s level. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center. 
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1. Introduction 
Two main provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concern enterprises’ 
behaviour on the market.  The Article 101 prohibits firms’ agreements that restrict competition, excepting the case 
in which the competition itself brings substantial benefits to customers or consumers, while the Article 102 prohibits 
enterprises’ abuse of dominant position.   
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These fundamental rules and prohibitions are further clarified by legal texts adopted by the Council or the 
European Commission, as appropriate and express the way by which the basic principles are applied in specific 
sectors or for certain types of agreements and companies’ behaviours.  It should be noted that, at the national level, 
the behaviour by which the competition could be affected within a Member State, is also prohibited.  
While under the European Union’s competition rules, individuals are not fined, their careers and jobs could be 
negatively affected by their bad choices and even the existence of the company where they work could be 
threatened. In some Member States, in accordance with the national legislation, the anticompetitive conduct of 
individuals could be penalized by fines and/or imprisonment, possibly in parallel with the fines applied to the 
organizations. 
The main responsibility concerning the compliance with the law in force, as in any other field, is that of those 
who are subject to it. The application of EU competition rules regarding all kind of organizations involves 
provisions that have to be taken into consideration in the business environment, in its daily life, because ignoring the 
law will not protect enterprises from the consequences of its violation.  
Although it is clear that companies are forced to comply with the law, they are free to decide how to do it. This is 
a natural thing in fact, given that the size of a business, its resources for appealing to the consultancy, the business 
activity as well as the risk exposure to engage in violations of competition law, all these vary considerably from case 
to case. In addition, the awareness of the named rules is always a prerequisite of their assimilation. 
Further, we are going to present some elements concerning the competition law applied to the enterprises as well 
as the ways to prevent its potential violations. 
 
2. Case studies 
We intend to highlight three case studies regarding the anticompetitive practices of several companies operating 
in some countries of the European Union. 
2.1. Cartel on banana marketi  
On April 8, 2005, the company Chiquita transmitted to the European Commission an application for leniency 
linked to the distribution and commercialization of imported bananas as well as of other exotic fruits. The 
information provided to the Commission led to the initiation of investigation procedure.  
During July 2004 – April 2005, a number of meetings were held between Chiquita’s representatives and those of 
its competitor, Pacific. The purpose of these meetings consisted in establishing an action plan for ensuring a 
maximum profit to the participants, as it was indicated by data brought by Chiquita for ascertaining the information 
exchange on bananas’ prices ranking (raw bananas– the so-called green price or ripe fruit – the so-called yellow 
price) that had to be applied. Thus, the price communicated every Friday, subsequent to the mutual information 
between the cartel’s members, was also provided to supermarkets in order to be applied starting with the next week 
in the retail chains. Mutual information was realized most often verbally, on Mondays in the case of raw bananas 
and on Thursdays in the case of ripe bananas. Pricing agreement affected the European Union, by fixing prices in 
the area of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.      
During the procedure, the Commission received from the Italian authorities copies of inspection documents 
which had taken place at Pacific Fruit Italy headquarter, as well as at the residence of one’s of company’s 
representative, in the context of the national investigation procedure. The Italian prosecutor authorised the 
transmission of documents towards the Commission, on the grounds that there was no injury caused to the national 
investigation addressing issues concerning the violation of competition law.   
On 2nd November 2007, Chiquita was informed by the Commission on the inspection planned to take place in 
two days at Chiquita’s headquarter in Italy, Rome as well as on the fact that company’s representative was going to 
have an interview with the Commission’s officials. On that occasion, Chiquita was reminded of benefiting from 
conditional immunity from fines (which is equivalent to zero fines in the case in which, during the investigation 
procedure, the company cooperates and continues to provide relevant information in order to complete the 
investigation).   
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Thus, between 28 November to 30 November, 2007 there were a number of inspections at the headquarters of 
Chiquita and Pacific enterprises. Throughout the investigation procedure, the Commission sent information requests 
to the port authorities.  
In the investigated period, Chiquita and Pacific coordinated their commercial strategy of operating on the markets 
of Greece, Italy and Portugal, by means of weekly coordination of price strategies.  
Finally, the Commission’s investigation led to the adoption of a decision ascertaining the violation of the Article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This violation was addressed to:  
x Chiquita Brands International, Inc.; 
x Chiquita Banana Company BV; 
x  Chiquita Italia SpA;; 
x FSL Holdings NV; 
x Leon Van Parys NV; 
x Pacific Fruit Company Italy SpA. 
 
And some fines were imposed to some of the cartel’s members such as:   
x FSL Holdings NV; 
x Leon Van Parys NV; 
x Pacific Fruit Company Italy SpA. 
 
Chiquita enterprise, as well as the group it was a part of, benefited from immunity in accordance with the 
leniency program. As a consequence, knowledge of the competition policy instruments (for example, the leniency 
program) may lead to exemption from payment of the fine. 
In economic terms, the financial situation of Chiquita enterprise, as it is reflected by sales figures in the following 
geographical areas between 2009 and 2011, is presented in the box below:  
Table 1. Chiquita’s net sales in the mentioned geographical areas, in USD 
State 2009 2010  2011 
United States 1943963 1895207 1793580 
Italy 235665 206767 229138 
Germany 
Other countries from EU 
Total EU countries 
Other non-EU countries 
Foreign net sales 
Total net sales 
212511 
689157 
1137333 
389139 
1526472 
3470435 
198665 
606522 
1011954 
320271 
1332225 
3227432 
199084 
597343 
1025565 
320151 
1345716 
3139296 
Source: 2012 Chiquita Annual Report 
 
Graphically, the representation of Chiquita’s sales, following the different geographical areas, looks like this: 
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Figure 1. The evolution of Chiquita’s sales (millions of euro), between 2009-2011 
2.2. Cartel on household washing powder marketii  
The case was initiated following a leniency application of Henkel enterprise. In June 2008, the Commission 
carried out unannounced inspections and Procter & Gamble filed a leniency application on September 8, 2008. On 
2nd October 2009, Unilever also submitted a leniency application.  
The unique and continuous infringement involving cartel members affected washing powder market with high 
cleaning power designed for use in washing machines and sold to consumers (detergent powder with high cleaning 
power, low foam). The cartel hit in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands.  
Violation sought to stabilize the position on the market as well as price coordination. Pricing agreement was 
connected to the implementation of an environment initiative according to which they applied a series of reductions 
concerning dosages and weights of detergent powders with high cleaning power and low foam. In the meantime, 
these reductions referred also to their corresponding packages.  
 Henkel, Procter & Gamble and Unilever tried to keep their market shares, ensuring themselves that no one 
would use the environment initiative in order to gain a competitive advantage and that their positions on the market 
would remain at the same level as before to have taken actions within this environmental motion (especially in terms 
of measures for product compaction).  
In terms of prices, Henkel, Procter & Gamble and Unilever have engaged themselves in the following 
anticompetitive practices: 
x First of all, they agreed to increase prices indirectly. In practice, parties agreed to keep prices unchanged during 
the implementation of the different phases of the environmental initiative. In particular, parties agreed not to 
decrease prices when products have been compacted, when the quality of products have diminished or in the case 
of collective reductions in the number of doses per package of the washing powder; 
x  Secondly, the three enterprises agreed to limit their promotional activity, this issue being considered also a kind 
of pricing agreement. In particular, parties agreed to exclude certain types of promotion during the 
implementation of different phases of the environmental initiative; 
x Third, parties agreed to a direct increase of prices by the end of 2004 which targeted specific markets and 
followed to be introduced in the order of their market position; the market leader would have been the first to 
introduce prices increase, followed by the other enterprises; 
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x Parties exchanged sensitive information concerning prices and their trading conditions and this action facilitated 
various forms of prices agreement.  
 
Following the inspections conducted by the Commission, cartel members appealed to the direct negotiation 
procedure in order to reduce the value of the applicable fine.  
On April 13, 2011, the Commission adopted the infringement decision and that of imposing fines. Henkel 
enterprise benefited from fines immunity, being the first company to have applied for leniency and furnishing 
relevant information for starting the investigation. It also cooperated during the development of the procedure in 
place.  
2.3 Cartel in the natural gas fieldiii  
In 1975, when enterprises Ruhrgas and GDF decided to build together the MEGAL pipeline to bring gas from 
Russia to Germany and France, they agreed by means of two addresses not to enter the domestic market of the other 
party. In accordance to these addresses, GDF was banned from furnishing to German consumers the gas transported 
through MEGAL while Ruhrgas was also banned from transporting gas through the named pipeline towards France. 
Up to the deadline of implementing the first European Directive on gas transportation, dating from 2000, GDF 
held the monopoly on the import of gas in France. As a result of raising the import monopoly and during the gradual 
liberalization of European gas markets, parties continued to apply additional letters from 1975. Regularly, E.ON, 
E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF gathered at different levels and discussed the implementation of the agreement on the 
newly liberalized market. The contacts between the mentioned parties which took place after 1999 confirmed the 
continuation of competition by means of the agreement in force.  
Although the parties signed a pro forma agreement in August 2004 which would have “confirmed” the fact that 
letters dating from 1975 had not been available any more, the market-sharing agreement continued to exist and 
produce effect starting from 1st January 1980 (within the German market) and between August 10, 2000 (within the 
French market) and at least, September 30, 2005 when the enterprises in discussion started to sell their products on 
the internal market of the other party and when they concluded a new set of agreements in terms of MEGAL 
pipeline. 
Sales affected by the violation of law referred to those of gas transported by E.ON and GDF by means of 
MEGAL pipeline in Germany excepting the sales achieved by E.ON inside the gas redundancy program as well as 
those addressed to France eligible consumers (sales are estimated as a percentage of GDF global sales of gas 
transported through MEGAL pipeline).  Regarding France, it was used exceptionally the average of sales affected 
during infringement and not the last complete fiscal year because the number and the type of eligible consumers 
increased significantly in that period.  
The decision of the Commission requested E.ON, E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez to end the infringement, to avoid 
repeating any act or conduct which could have an identical or even similar purpose or effect and imposed fines to 
the enterprises mentioned above. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Linking corporate objectives to the external factors concerning the competition policy does represent a true goal 
for every enterprise defining its market strategy. The motivation lies not only on the economic benefits brought to 
the entity measured by means of profitability indicators, but also on the positive externalities generated on 
customers, consumers, employees or environmental factors. Thus, the knowledge of the code of ethics as well as 
that of corporate governance, in accordance with the social responsibility principles, together with the full 
recognition of competition rules do represent the stock-in-trade of the necessary tools in the enterprises’ decision-
making systems.   
 The simple reach of a maximum yield for stock actions or the increase of profit distributed in dividends may be 
in shareholders short-term advantage, but in the absence of market adapted strategies, attempting to get the same 
results in a long-term horizon proves to be a difficult option. 
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The cases taken as examples from the practice of European Commission show the lack of a market independent 
behaviour.   
Pricing agreements, customers’ allocation and market sharing are among the most serious forms of cartels whose 
direct or potential effects lead to critical damages to the competitive environment. 
Another important aspect refers to that in the case of an anticompetitive practice, when the parent company is 
sanctioned because of the anticompetitive conduct of its subsidiary, the two enterprises being jointly and severally 
liable. In the literature in the field, the concept of “economic unit” defines in such a way the joint liability of the 
named companies. 
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